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10 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Executive Director

SUBJECT: Liabilities/Vulnerabilities - Opportunities/Initiatives

1. I'm very upbeat about the Agency in 1983 and, indeed, through the balance of the 1980's. After nearly a decade of investigation, dissection, management turnover and paranoia, we've come a long way toward restoring credibility with the Executive and Legislative Branches. Interestingly, our track record with the Judicial Branch, which knew far less about intelligence than the other two branches prior to the FOIA revision, has been consistently good; the reason, I think, has been a combination of good homework and the studious avoidance of arbitrary and capricious use of DCI authorities or other allowable legal exemptions.

2. The greatest potential liability is us. We were so unnerved by the investigative process that we exhibited a singular capacity, for shooting ourselves in the foot. Increased credibility, and national need, have resulted in bigger budgets, more staff positions and approval for recapitalizing. It behooves us to be smart in accepting the increased support and resources.

4. Counterintelligence, counterterrorism and security, likewise, are areas receiving strongly needed support—and in which overreaction is easy. There is a great need for in-house education on these subjects, for consistency and for strengthened discipline—as well as for innovative thinking. ADP (more appropriately information handling) security remains the major vulnerability and challenge in bridging collection with analysis. The 1980's challenge in information handling is even greater than it was in the 1950's and early 1960's when the Agency and Community were on the leading edge of that profession. A revived and re-directed effort, with ADP as supporting technology not dominant focus, is in order.

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5. Obviously the counterbalance to us as liability is us as the major strength. That means adherence to the highest standards in recruiting but it also means smarter day-to-day work with those hired. Career challenge in CIA exceeds that of almost any other institution, whether one is an operations officer, a political scientist, engineer, economist, ADP programmer, commo technician or auditor. The geographic and functional scope, the technological leading edge aspects, the purpose of it all—can and do draw significant numbers of highly qualified folk. We are focused at the moment, properly, on speeding up applicant processing so we don't lose good people from the pipeline. We can also take some very fundamental steps to retain them and keep them motivated, once hired.

6. Another area in which the Agency was on the leading edge for 25 years was employee benefits and services. It may be a political reality that we cannot unilaterally seek personnel benefits different from some others in the Community but we can lead the Community, both in legislative proposals and in modifications within DCI authorities. I think we can do our day-to-day personnel administration with less bureaucracy and legal jargon in our communications with the troops. And I also think that attention to an uncluttered reasonably aesthetic work environment and recognition for work well done, when coupled with intellectual job satisfaction, can go one hell of a way to counter grumbling over salary disparities with the outside world.

7. I think too that we have to fight the temptation to try to solve the expanded requirements issues, whether operational or analytic, simply by adding whatever staff or dollar increases the traffic will bear. As an informed guess, conditioned by history, I'd say that the FY-84 position level [redacted] additional, should be enough. Line management has to do more evaluating, prioritizing, re-ordering and deleting—and has to be encouraged to do so as a positive thing.


8. Finally, a word about external relations. We don't want oversight to be micromanagement so we must have credibility with the Congressional Committees and PFIAB. That means a non-adversarial but correct professional relationship with smart liaison—the same sort of non-arbitrary, non-capricious, tactful approach which has worked pretty well with the courts. I do think our present arrangements for dealing with Congress need considerable revamping—we are being nickled-and-dimed to death by the staffs and don't help ourselves by the multiplicity of uncoordinated contacts. That can be turned around. Credibility fostering and Congressional support building (particularly with the staffs) should be the major liaison activity; legislation lobbying after FOIA should diminish significantly. I encourage retaining the very low profile policy with regard to both the general public and the press. A real and exciting challenge exists in future sanitized release of economic intelligence [redacted]

9. Anticipating that my colleagues will have more informed specific operational or intelligence analysis initiatives to suggest, I've dwelt above with general principles and management. A few specifics that might be considered include:

a. We should initiate a program at the level of the Secretary of Defense, or NSC if necessary, to make arrangements for the exploitation and field coordination of the collection of information by the military assistance units overseas. [redacted]


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d. The Soviets, not to mention the American public and the Congress, distrust U.S. strategic military preparations. The Administration and new Soviet regime talk past each other. An estimate should be prepared which will give the Administration (and Congress) a better understanding of Soviet perceptions of U.S. military plans, capabilities, and political objectives.

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